This paper questions the assumption of the bulk of Western philosophy that reasoning in general, and moral reasoning in particular, can be undertaken without any consideration of the unique cultural experiences of those who engage in it. It proposes a communitarian alternative for thinking about subjecthood. It further contends that there is need for professional African philosophers to assist their people in the quest for solutions to current pertinent socio-economic challenges facing them.
For many years now, UNESCO has been at the center of conferences that reflect on the philosophical underpinnings of culture. And for even longer time is UNESCO's promotion of awareness about, and the development of cultural values around the world.
The promotion of the recordings of people's languages and histories, within and across cultures, are well known UNESCO projects. Historians should be acquainted with the authoritative UNESCO General History of Africa. And many philosophers will probably recall the several anthologies across the continent and elsewhere which are results of Unesco-organized conferences. In East Africa particularly, readers will recall the volume, Philosophy and Cultures, co-edited by the late Henry Odera Oruka and myself in 1983.
Among the most recent of such efforts was the publication of the proceedings of the Cotonou conference of 2004 under the title La rationalité, une ou plurielle? edited by Paulin J. Hountondji (2007) . Not to be ignored are the many other conferences and seminars whose proceedings have yet to be converted into published texts.
A title such as that of Hountondji's anthology mentioned above is significant for several reasons. One of them is that it indicates a leap into a novel terrain -one that escapes the strictures and inertia of the Oxford school of rationality of the 1970s. It does this despite the fact that its title betrays the international and multi-cultural format of many Unescoorganized meetings. Recent shifts in philosophical inquiry have witnessed drifts from fictitious objectivisms and universalisms to how people express differently their motivations or frame their experiences in response to the vast and diverse needs of life across the globe. The point is simple enough -that while it can be assumed that there are many things in the world to which people react and with which they act, what cannot be assumed is what those things are like. What has clearly become important is the interrogation, not of which universal principles will sustain the quest for and help attain one truth for all, but rather what humanly worthy goals, and which motivations, warrant pursuit with the best and most complete rational means for the improvement and sustenance of good living which includes the recognition and respect for the dignity of all humans. 1 evolutionary progression of systems and things through moments of "normalcy" and subsequent subversion. Hegel had seen this dialectic in the human spirit before Darwin said it of organisms. It is important to note here, however, that these observations do not diminish for the human spirit the cultural factor about the specific adaptations, for only what makes its way into accepted or "normal" practice subsequently gets to be communicated to future generations. This is what brings me to the consideration of the obligation that hangs upon us, as members of our societies and institutions with the privilege to attend to our own people's problems by identifying, defining and rationally examining, through insightful discourse, the values that best serve us in our desires to preserve life and to improve its quality for all of us.
Taming our Ever Present Past
To be sure, like all creative and epoch-changing intellectual traditions, contemporary philosophical thought that advocate certain crucial freedoms for the individual, and by extension advocate a pluralistic world erected on rational principles, arises in recognition of several things. First, it is in recognition of evolved epistemological and moral tenets from those positions of the past that became the bases of oppression of persons whether as individuals or as members of communities and nations. While rejecting the untenable aspects of the past is not always a welcome or comfortable undertaking for all, it is a duty for those upon whom society bestows the privilege of being researchers and thinkers of divers callings. There are discomforting matters in our societies which should cause conceptual and moral pain to any conscientious person whose understanding urges him or her to stop an evil, or one or the other of the calamities of varying proportions in our midst.
How many of you have had the unfortunate opportunity to converse with a person of the village who claims that a witch-doctor, as we have grown to call these con artists, removed a golf-ball-sized animal hairball from under the skin in their belly because they had not been able to go to the bathroom for three days? If we know our biology well, we should know that removing such a large foreign object from under the skin anywhere on the human body would require a pretty large incision that would later require a proportionate number of stitches to patch up. Their story is that witch-doctors do not
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leave marks on their patients, something that I always think should have turned them into some of the most coveted plastic surgeons in this age of bodily manipulations. Be that as it may, the story does not even include an explanation of how the huge lump of hair would have come to be so embedded under the skin in the first place.
Many times narrators of such sad inventions know that you went to school, but either have no clue about what you gain there, or they just do not give regard to what your formal education may have exposed you to, so they expect you to go along. And when you object, chances are that you will be admonished for being "young" and lacking in understanding. In other words, because they do not associate learning with inquiry into the same world you share, it does not occur to them that you could have a different understanding of how the world works. School, and the learning associated with it, is about distant matters that do not -and dare not -separate you from them. This is a narrative version of the long debate that many of you might have detected already as stemming from that controversial school fancily called ethnophilosophy.
3 But to cut the very long story really short, please consider Hountondji's warning about letting the two orders stand side-by-side. 4 Here is the danger: while those who are buried in the customary order do not suffer the pain of conceptual confusion even as they die unnecessary deaths, those of us who are acquainted with both and can tell the difference risk all the pitfalls that come with intellectual dishonesty. We face our own challenges, and we ought to pick up the responsibility that they bestow upon us. Unless the media reports we read intentionally mislead us, someone should address at least some of the issues which we notice to emerge around us. Indeed, besides the moral concerns that the examples I have in mind raise, they also are definitely based on skewed biological assumptions that we cannot ignore. Below, then, are some examples. making the judgements, these conditions were "proof" that the children were witches who deserved death. In highly volatile and unstable conditions such as define the socioeconomic circumstances of the DRC, nutrition is bound to be a problem to everyone, let alone children who become prime victims of war, famine, and other socially ravaging situations. How can well-known signs of malnutrition become signs of moral culpability which we are seen to be happy to meet with the ultimate punishment?
We have been told in widespread media reports that in East Africa, and in Tanzania in particular, persons with albinism are being killed. There is deep concern globally among human rights activists that such persons are being left to die at the hands of town and village mobs or witchdoctors who brand them as "bad omen" to their collective wellbeing, and dismembered body parts of these innocent victims of sheer murder are used for ritual purposes. The general view from a human rights perspective is that the government response is minimal and appears to be limited only to face-saving action when considered against the numbers of victims who have already fallen to these acts of savagery. What appears to be totally absent is the intellectual response when these acts happen on the basis of refutable knowledge claims. So, without amusement, we should ask ourselves:
how does one become blame-worthy in any shape or form, let alone being judged to be punishable by death, for how one is born, such as being born with deficiency in the
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amount of melanine required for skin pigmentation? What is the exact content of the knowledge that informs or warrants such extreme actions against our kin and neighbors?
In other words, besides the legal ramifications of the lynching of such innocent persons, we also have the moral and biological misconceptions to tackle. While the judicial system will punish wrong-doers, perpetrators of wrongs remain likely to repeat their crimes unless the knowledge that spurs the act is corrected. Being caught may disrupt the timing and perhaps the degree of an act, but it does not necessarily deter its repeat so long as its premises remain intact. Our unavoidable challenge can be framed in the following question form: On who does the responsibility of correcting such misconceptions fall?
We may not be directly responsible for these obvious crimes meted undeservedly on our fellow humans, but we are no less culpable when we see and disapprove of them being committed by others yet fail to address them. It is our time, the time, for philosophers to rise up because there is no other criterion that would make these issues, and thinking about them, more African than they already are.
Focusing on them as our issues will place us on the path to a rational autonomy by reading and discussing everything else with informed skepticism. We risk becoming accomplices in evil, unless we can rise up to ask the pertinent questions that will bring a sense of security and equal self-worth to and for all of us. We cannot sit in conferences, or in our campus offices and classrooms, doubting ourselves by asking that someone show us what African philosophy is, or by listening to European tricksters who tell us that we cannot be doing African philosophy unless we speak in our own mother tongues while we surrender intellectual leadership to village quacks. Be weary of such people because they are no worse than the village quacks killing persons with albinism in our midst. The time for these misfits has been long gone, and we can carefully identify genuine and serious collaborators in the cultivation and development of the human good through leveled dialogue. On our part we need to show that our education carries some worth for our societies by addressing the epistemological, moral, and other philosophically significant issues that contemporary beliefs and practices are throwing at us.
Issues vs. the "How" of Philosophy
How should we approach the discussion of our problems? My answer is that it does not matter, so long as we adhere to the maxims of thorough understanding and explanation of issues. Again, Shaaban Robert left us excellent examples of such dialogues. More recently, at the University of Dar es Salaam, Ernest Wamba Dia Wamba worked so hard at the idea of visualizing knowledge production as a local process. His quest in this regard was a continuation of what some Tanzanian thinkers had long given leadership in, especially in the well-known knowledge production theories of Mwalimu Julius Nyerere.
Our suggestions at solutions will come from our deliberations of whether what is claimed to be the case, in any of the examples I gave above, is really so, and from whether, again given our explanations, the disputed solutions are warranted, or even good at all. I take it that among philosophers, such an approach to issues may lie heavily on conceptual analysis, without making that method, for all that it is worth, an end unto itself.
To be honest, I find the rift between analytic philosophy and any other approach to be a matter that is pretty unnecessary to our goals, and the idea of "philosophy for its own sake" a deeply dishonest intellectual position. But that does not mean that our training as philosophers takes place in departments that act as molds of sorts: it is the nature of the academy. What we should not forget is that schools are some of the most ideologized places one can ever walk into, and our sojourn and molding within these ideological frameworks of the academy are the trademarks they imprint on our minds, and they follow us later to see how we represent them on their behalf. So I want to assume that if you were molded in the corridors where the influence of Frege and his following in the movement of the Nineteen-twenties is predominant, you probably want to call yourself an analytic philosopher. If, on the other hand, you were molded by the hands that got their casting in the Hegelian foundry, you are likely to call yourself a "European continentalist". The latter, and in fact both designations, can be pretty meaningless.
Elsewhere (Masolo 2010, 1-2) , I have referred to a collaboration on an article in 1993 between V.Y. Mudimbe and Kwame Anthony Appiah (Mudimbe and Apiyah 1993, 113-138) , not only because they themselves discussed the unusefulness of the rift and sometimes irreconcilable animosity between the representatives of these intellectual lineages in the
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European practice of philosophy, but also because it had to take two Africans, outstanding in their own respective rights as magisterial representatives of these two methods -professionally acquired by them in the course of their respective sojourns in the European corridors where they were tools of practice as made available to them as part of the package of their political adoption -to point out that such a rift does not do justice to the need for an integrative approach to knowledge-production. 7 Their point is that there is more to gain from a collaboration between any set of good methods that help us do what our discipline calls on us to do.
If, therefore, we have learned to do philosophy by asking what it is that justifies certain claims, or makes some better or more obliging than others, then we should pay far less attention to the boundaries of method. Instead, we should adopt and apply them, any of them, together or separately as occasion may require, but as diligently as possible, as they may best serve us in the task of creating the best understanding of the world around us.
So, if, for example, I was deliberating the problems I listed above, I would ask, as a way of addressing issues of gender and racial inequity in our midst, what it is that a person's body constitution or skin pigmentation does to his or her capacities in relevant circumstances as to warrant differential treatment in respect to those with similar relevant or required capacities for performing a task. That way we get to address the assumptions upon which various forms of discrimination are built. In more specific relation to the exemplary issues I started with, we would ask what it is about being a victim of malnutrition that deprives a child of his or her fundamental human rights. Even while it remains one of the most controversial forms of punishment of fellow human beings, death is legally administered on others only on the grounds of grave crimes. So, we may ask, what is it about being malnourished, or being deprived -on the strength of our known genetic heredity -of expected skin pigmentation as a result of deficiency in the specific hormone that does the job, that would warrant putting persons suffering those conditions to death? Or how does their condition, which is purely physiological, affect the wellbeing of their neighbors?
On blaming and murdering our children for being malnourished, the double tragedy faced by these innocents should not escape anyone, as such acts amount to exterminating those who already are victims of socio-economic circumstances brought on by our own failures.
The wars over ethnic hegemony, or over control of illicit trade spurred by corruption, are not only senseless and unnecessary, but also create the chain of effects from which malnutrition results. The case of persons with albinism , as I have already indicated, is a genetic condition for which noone bears responsibility in the moral sense of the term. As a result, no victim bears any blame in either case. But how do we get to be aware of the appropriate responses to the specific moral issues related to these examples from a pre- Who, upon reading and contrasting these works, would still say that we have a methodological crisis in philosophy in this continent? I urge that you do not restrain your students from indulging in all the texts available out there, but it will be your duty to point out the virtues of the methods that set them apart, as well as the similarity of the circumstances from which they sprung in the minds of their respective authors. 8 In doing so, I trust, you will be achieving what Gayatri Chakravorty Spivak, a leading Indian-born postcolonial scholar and theorist, has said recently about how to put the European text to the service of our own quests rather than the other way round (Spivak 1999) . For all of us, 8 The backdrop of Kant's work is Martin Luther's protest against Ecclesiastical hegemony in matters of knowledge, morality, and destiny -values which his philosophy bestows on every individual as capable, in autonomy from any institutional hegemony, to arrive at truths as his rational capacity, sometimes mediated by the nature of the object of knowledge itself, allows him. Neither custom nor any type of organized powerhouse has any business shepherding humans to its own perceptions of truths. Shaaban Robert's work, on the other hand, sprang from his reflections on the succession of the powers of domination in Eastern and Central Africa, slavery, and the rise of the economy of native marginalization instituted by these systems with which Islam and Christianity bore only a paradoxical relationship. While preaching moral systems inimical to the core values of the oppressive power systems, the religious institutions lacked the ability to deliver veritable social transformation.
but especially for our young philosophers, whether you are still in school, recently graduated, or just starting on your career, Spivak's critique of European philosophers from a postcolonial standpoint should be embraced as an important lesson, not by adopting everything she says, but by taking up the challenge that we do not read anything without asking crucial questions about where the philosopher speaks from in terms of the particular historical and societal issues that he or she would be speaking from and to. That lesson is old now, yet, at the same time, no lesson loses its salt until everyone it is meant for has heard and learned from it. Do not read or teach Hegel, Kant, Marx, or even John Rawls more recently, as if their claims were rarified universals, whatever those may be.
Instead, ask what there is in them that might resonate with your own situation.
Kant and the Disinterested Reason
The mention of Kant here is instructively deliberate. The liberal movement in our time has made Kant not just a great philosopher, but the greatest philosopher of our time. At least one reason for this rallying around Immanuel Kant's philosophy by today's social and moral theorists of the liberal creed is Kant's view of the nature and role of reason, especially in moral judgements. Although embodied and dependent on the senses in its quest to attain truths about the starry heavens above and the stark objects around us, in moral judgements, he thought, reason is capable of extricating itself from the baggage of distractions which come with the corporeality of the knower. As in our knowledge of the external world of objects, Kant speculated, it was possible to chart out the dimensions of our knowledge of "the moral law within us". In the moral domain, the objective is to determine, or define, that cardinal principle on the basis of which a moral judgement must always be right for everyone by virtue of its rational status alone. There are to be no strings, no attachments on the path to the determination of how we ought to conduct ourselves in respect of right and wrong. The laws herein are almost mechanical, and therefore universal.
The world of moral law, Kant thought, is different, yet it too, according to the German Enlightenment philosopher, must be grounded on some principle(s) which place moral judgements at a comparable if not higher level of universality with those that guide empirical experience. In other words, moral judgements, like their counterparts in the judgement of sensory experience, ought to have those grounds upon which they are objectively true for all people at all times. For moral judgements to be so, they must be extricated from idiosyncratic interests of any kind, and their rightness be founded on the laws of moral judgement, namely that they be directly related to what alone must be right -the moral law -and also emerge from the free will that dictates to us that it is not only what we ought to do, but indeed what we must want to do. Thus the only valid ground for a moral act ought to be the product of this law, and such product should be not only right but also the same for everyone in their right mind, and to it they should strive to adhere.
Such a law lies in the alliance between reason and (good) will.
The true function of reason, Kant argues, "must be to produce a will which is not merely good as a means to some further end, but is good in itself" (Kant 1981, 9, 396 and to the demands of our sensuous nature. Consequently, to have moral worth, our actions must be the direct function of our sense of duty with regard to the act. Inclination or habit alone, as customs, including those habits we acquire from memberships of specific faiths, often teach us, is not enough to bestow moral worth on our actions, not even when the inclination is to do what is our duty. Only the motive of duty bestows moral worth on an action. Moral worth has no specific object; rather, it depends, according to Kant, "merely on the principle of volition according to which, without regard to any objects of the faculty of desire, the action has been done" (Kant 1981, 13, 400 The Kantian propositions tally with the libertarian standards and ideals that they alone become the basis of our social living. According to the latter, for example, we should support an ordinance that grants rights to a group of minorities against prevailing prejudices, not because we stand to gain from the consequences of such ordinance, but purely on the ground that there is no rational ground in support of a denial. In such a case, the act of supporting the rights of a minority group acquires a moral worth because it is based purely on the principle that individuals and groups should be granted all rationally defined freedoms and rights, so long as they do not pose a threat to similar freedoms and rights of others. A moral person, according to Kant, is he/she who acts according to principle. Thus, he further says, "Rather than act on the basis of the desires of the moment, the person of principle appeals to a general rule or rationally articulated reason in order to ascertain what to do" (Arrington 1998, 266) .
Such principle, as we earlier mentioned, must be one that transcends the moment, such as a specific goal or self-interests of the actor. Now, I am sure you can apply these principles to many issues that we face in our communities today. Here are a few examples: When we run for office in our multi-ethnic urban constituencies, we urge voters to make their choices based on no other factor than what they expect from the occupier of the office, who, in their estimation, is likely to meet such expectations. In other words, we argue, sometimes only by implication, that official performance has nothing to do with gender, ethnicity, religion, or such narrow interest identities. But now we might ask whether we should not accord the same judgement to persons whose skins do not appear similar to our own, whether by race or, as in the case of persons with albinism, by some other factor that affects the superficial appearance of our bodies, so long as their capacities are not compromised by such conditions. Or why not accord the same rights to social life-styles to persons whose preferences are not identical with our own, so long as they break no laws in their practices? If you think of these matters deeply, you will be reminded to reflect on why we are prone to veer off the course of reason in regard to some specific issues in life. And often we have no good reason other than mere prejudice. And prejudice against someone on the basis of their ethnicity is neither better nor worse than prejudice based on gender, sexual orientation, dietary preferences, or color of skin. If prejudice is wrong, oppose its manifestation in any form.
Our opposition to Kant is for a different reason, and it is nearly the basis for our opposition to the school that Charles Larmore ascribes to. My point is that our rationalization of practical choices should be done with acute awareness of the possible implications that the principles of judgement in one situation may have for our choices in other situations whose similarities to the former may not always be obvious except by analytical thinking, and that we should strive to be consistent where there are sufficient indications of similarities of objects of our judgement or choice.
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Here are Kant's propositions about morality properly speaking:
(i) An action must be done from duty in order to have any moral worth. (Inclination to preserve life, for example, may be good, and people do it all the time, but such an action has no moral worth strictly speaking).
(ii) An action done from duty has its moral worth, not in the purpose that is to be attained by it, but in the maxim according to which the action is determined.
(iii) From (i) and (ii) above, it follows that Duty is the necessity of an action done out of respect for the law. I can indeed have an inclination for an object as the effect of my 9 I once had a group of students from a racial minority group who were eager to vote for an ordinance that was aimed at denying certain rights to gay people until I asked them to consider why the grounds for denying gay people those rights, which were not necessarily guaranteed for members of their group, would not be applicable to them too. If any set of goods, "g", can be denied to any group identified by its culture, then there would be no ground to exempt any culturally definable group from being equally denied the same goods.
proposed action; but I can never have respect for such an object, just because it is merely an effect and is not an activity of the will" (Kant 1981, 12, 399-400) .
The form of the moral principle, according to these propositions, is simply the reverence for the law as law. It is the obedience of the law that matters and which must be the deciding motive for an action. "Therefore", Kant says, "the pre-eminent good which is called moral can consist in nothing but the representation of the law in itself, and such a representation can admittedly be found only in a rational being insofar as this representation, and not some expected effect, is the determining ground of the will. This good is already present in the person who acts according to this representation, and such good need not be awaited merely from the effect" (Kant 1981, 13-14) . Thus, if, as in the often cited example, a moral imperative has the form of a law like "always tell the truth", it
would not matter, in Kant's eyes, whether doing so will result in the death or some other type of harm to oneself or someone else.
Whether they are philosophical or only ordinary, principles of morality are norms, rationally determined to guide conduct where it may occur or only imagined to be possible. This includes the norm that one ought to ignore any effects of his or her conduct when considering the best possible principle. Do we not all think like this when considering the best way to determine a course of action that would be fair to all?
Suppose, for example, that you were a member of a search committee charged with hiring someone for a position in your department, and it turns out that one of the applicants is a The requirement that a moral norm disregard any effects is arrived at by elimination of what does or does not matter or apply to creating an ideal condition for everyone, indeed anyone involved, not by divine-like intuition. In your deliberations, members of your search committee are likely to ask themselves how they themselves would react, if they were this candidate, upon discovering that they were hired, or shunned, on account of the perception of their possible effect on the department rather than on their relevant qualifications. So they try to assess the moral status of such a decision from their imagined candidature. It is helpful to try to see the other person through one's own judgement of the same circumstance by imaginarily being them. But, as you can tell already, Kant had no room for the "golden rule" -Do unto others as you would have others do unto you -because it requires exactly the opposite of the dictates of the dry duty theory. But the golden rule is often the way most people arrive at the framing of the idealized or "the absolutely objective" rule, whatever that may be. But now imagine that one of your candidates is a member of a minority group who historically have not had equal opportunity for hire at college level. He or she is a good candidate, but not the top one, and there are no other mitigating factors than their qualifications. Your job advertisement particularly encouraged members of underrepresented groups to apply.
How, in your view, should your search committee decide on the hire in light of the rule of fairness?
Paradoxically, the idea of "absolutely objective" norms is the insight of transcendental philosophizing, but also its deepest pitfall, especially in practical matters such as morality and politics. By extricating moral knowledge from how people feel about the world and experience, Kant's theory led to and became the reference for moral realism. His own position appears to have been built on the metaphysical component of moral realism, but later philosophers have contributed the semantic and epistemological components.
Together, loosely described, they combine to make the claim that there are moral facts, complete with properties, that exist independently of people's beliefs and attitudes about what is right and wrong. In this sense, moral realists claim that moral assertions, which may include assertions of some moral beliefs, can be true or false, and that, with appropriate method, discernment can be made between them.
But, to be sure, opposition to moral realism does not necessarily entail or lead to Consequently, our reading of this work may involve attributing to it different matters of importance as well as matters with different importance due to the kind of cases that concern us in our own time. Thus our discursive engagement with it today stems from its possible effect on someone who observes in our own time competing commentaries on cases which indicate the impact of socio-historical variations on specific cultures.
African Traditions and the Place of Reason
Kant's notion that the moral law is present only in rational beings allows us to examine some recent discourses on African traditions with reference to the grounds -whether explicitly expressed or only implied -on which they should or should not be respected. Yet, to be sure, traditions are hardly formulated just so people can do something for the sake of it, nor just because groups may be different one from another. They are not absurd. What is absurd is the attitude of holding them to be sacrosanct and unadjustable to changing and better values and needs. The factual lack of dialogue within and about traditions cannot be taken as evidence of traditions' relativism, or of traditions' denial of individual freedoms. Kant's grounding of the moral law in the dictates of reason understood in its metaphysical and transcendental abstraction from the social realities of its uses appears, in one interpretation, to be remarkably and unrealistically individualist.
For him it is reason, and reason alone by virtue of its inherent ends, that reveals the universality and necessity required of a moral law. Hence, for one to be required to act on any maxim, such maxim must have, or must be shown to be capable of having, the form of universality and necessity as to be requireable of any person as a necessary basis of action.
What one might find paradoxical about those who embrace this position is the account, if any, of their embrace of it. In other words, is it embraced for its value of being capable of enhancing those conditions viewed to be favorable to the enjoyment of certain values. But
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if so, would these not constitute motives for preferring the applicable principle? And are they not arrived at by way of eliminating potential encumberments to an ideal mode of moral agency? Yet Kant writes:
Therefore, I need no far-reaching acuteness to discern what I have to do in order that my will may be morally good. Inexperienced in the course of the world and incapable of being prepared for all its contingencies, I only ask myself whether I can also will that my maxim should become a universal law. If not, then the maxim must be rejected, not because of any disadvantage accruing to me or even to others, but because it cannot be fitting as a principle in a possible legislation of universal law, and reason exacts from me immediate respect for such legislation (Kant 1981, 15) .
But is that not what we are as human beings? We have neither experience of what the
world will throw at us nor preparedness for all its contingencies, in their actuality or possibilities. But based on the contingencies we know or may be acquainted with, and on what we can reasonably forecast and conjecture based on these, we can design fairly reasonable maxims of practice, and desire that they, and even strive to make them, apply to all cases all the time. But it is a different matter to think that there are, other than this desire alone, a priori maxims with specific identities. Good is not a specific "thing", so it does not bear any specific characteristics other than the properties we transfer to it from the motivations, attitudes and other inner states of people's minds as discernible from their reaction to specific things and conditions of their worlds.
Libertarians believe, among other things, that there are no specific conditions, other than liberty, to which anyone should be compelled to live or act. They prioritize personal autonomy while supporting all endeavors, public and private, which extend and sustain those conditions under which dignified autonomy becomes the right of everyone. There must be another way of looking at how good lives are produced. In apparent concordance with Kant's separation of object or content of the moral principle, what he calls its goals or effects, from its form, that is, its universality and necessity, Kwasi Wiredu (1996) makes a distinction between custom and morality proper. In other words, he draws a distinction between the relativity of fact and the objectivity or universality of value. The paradoxicality of human embodiment allows for cultural variations in some specific human beliefs and practices while the fundamental basis of these beliefs, as different from their immediate objects, and which Wiredu considers to be the crucial point about being human, remains universally the same for all the members of the species (see Wiredu 1983; 1995) . For him as for Kant, such universality is grounded in the universality of the form -that is, that moral rules, like rules of thought, are attuned to the function of the human species -in which ideal human life incorporates considerations of humaneness rather than mere survival.
Then, just as sharply, Wiredu would switch toward the embrace of Dewey's evolutionary pragmatism, namely that such human condition demands a synthetic rather than an a principle of sympathetic impartiality" (Wiredu 1996) .
According to Wiredu, it is not hard to see the practical strength of such a principle (of sympathetic impartiality), since "it takes little imagination to foresee that life in any society in which everyone openly avowed the contrary of this principle and acted accordingly inevitably would be 'solitary, poor, nasty, brutish', and probably short" (Wiredu 1996, 29) . According to this view, Kant's categorical imperative would thus have made more sense if it had been openly built on this human biological principle which "is a human universal transcending cultures viewed as social forms and customary beliefs and practices. In being common to all human practice of morality, it is a universal of any non-brutish form of human life" (Wiredu 1996, 29) . Here, Wiredu builds on what is well-known to be particularly underdeveloped in Kant's enterprise. In other words, despite Kant's stress on the mind's discovery, within itself, of its own unity, that of the world, and the unity of the world and mind in experience, it still seemed as though Kant were moving from this personal experience to suggestions of its supposed universality without adequate ontological grounds transcending the individual psyche. Wiredu attempts to close that gap by suggesting that the unity between the particular and the universal does not reside in the abstract. Rather, it is in the biological unity of the species.
For Wiredu, both cognitive and moral capacities of humans are the function of the organically specific type that humans are. Mind, the seat of cognitive and moral reason, is the function of this specific biological condition whose accomplishment (in the specific order proper to being human) depends on the social basis of being properly human.
Reason resides in the social nature of humans, not in the unity of individual mind; it springs from and prospers by virtue of the act of communication. In fact, if a person were to be isolated from society and deprived of communication with other humans from birth, he/she would be confined to a "solitary, poor, nasty, and brutish", and probably also very short life.
The source of morality proper, Wiredu (1983) argues, cannot be in the supernatural. It is neither the deities, the ancestors, nor the taboos to which are attributed the non-human powers to exact sanctions on those who have committed aberrations. "Justification of behavior can [therefore] only take the form of relating it to rules.
[And] Obviously, the rules cannot be justified by reference to themselves but only by reference to higher order rules, where possible, and in other cases, to considerations more general than any specific rule of conduct" (Wiredu 1983, 7) . In other words, justification of moral behavior must be sought in the discourses through and by which meanings and effects of behavior are "cannot do" regarding his/her actions will be limited to questions of his/her own abilities to carry out his/her plans, or to whether and why any of his/her plans should take precedence over others. In the minimum, communitarians claim that morality is not innate in the sense of preceding the presence of humans among fellow humans. Even in our remotest imagination, thoughts of morality as being autonomous of human desiring and effecting moral maxims in real situations is possible only as abstraction from known real situations, not in a vacuum.
The idea of a "jadak-kende" (the individual as a windowless monad) can only be allegorical. Chances are that even the purely conjectural idea of an "original state" is made possible only by our ruminations on the real. Morality too is about standards and expectations, however low, high, unusual, or outright weird. The idea of the imaginary "jadak-kende" is that there are some matters of conduct about which we can afford some 
Conclusion
Metaphysics has always been a fascinating subject. But it has undergone a radical transformation over the years. Gone are the days when human nature was typically explicated in neglect of the concerns of real people in social and historical realities. Gone are the times when bodily characteristics required to live in society and in time was considered a contingent property of human experience. Admittedly, any theory of the self will be abstract, but it does not have to be a construct of an entity that is out of touch with everyday encounters in which one is either a perpetrator or victim of the use of the mechanisms of socio-political fragmentation. The substantial self, by contrast, as we see in one's quest to have a grip of who one is and in one's quest to have a grip of what the world around one is and how to deal with it, is an entity that is constantly in a struggle to self-constitute in a sea of processes laid down by other selves in similar struggles, and by institutions that impose norms by and on the basis of which these struggles are carried out. In these processes, the self is either a violator or a victim of others' violations.
One's intersubjective condition allows one to be both an individual and a dependent member of a social world defined by an exchange between its inhabitants. Maybe the abstract self can construct a sense of moral propriety without thinking of his/her own fate as someone whose arms, or those of his/her child or neighbor, have been severed off by someone who thinks that his/her real life is nothing but a mirage, that he/she is only a ghost, or that his/her imaginary absence is not different from dying under the brutality of a machette-wielding attacker. "Conceptualizing the self as an abstract metaphysical entity", writes Fred C. Alford, "leads to a way of thinking that in the end values not the self but the abstract principles from which it is derived" (Alford 1991, 2) .
I have tried to propose a communitarian alternative for thinking about subjecthood. Those of my readers who have followed recent discussions in African philosophy will make these connections, and I boldly suggest that this alternative includes the work of Kwame Shivji (1986) , for example, led a socialist understanding of law that saw it not as an autonomous system of statutes and regulations, but rather as a body of principles whose subject matter is the interests of real people. So when we talk of justice, it is crucial to try to find out what a group of people's moral psychology is about some good. Sometimes people may not exactly be opposed to sharing any said good with other people, but they need to be told, through analytic deliberation, that conflict is engendered primarily by an insufficient understanding of the implications of our actions upon others, or by the conflict between our interests and those of others which we decline to take into serious consideration. their corresponding relations to value systems of the establishments, but are also a reminder of the ugly pasts, know how sensitive group identity claims can be. They are no more or less political than our own identities have been in service of our complex histories of migrations and settlements many times over.
Identity communitarianism makes the claim that certain strands of liberalism contain a faulty notion of the person because they give insufficient space to particularistic group identities. This strand could be identified with what is now known as "rootless cosmopolitan liberalism", and is espoused by theoreticians who have their national political establishments as the only large-scale groups they can identify with, but which they claim to be unnecessary to individual freedoms. These liberals either are, or are cognates of libertarians. By the same token, some identity communitarians fail to notice, and definitely fail to warn, of the lurking dangers of claiming group identities as metaphysical characteristics.
Thus while morally defined identity communitarianism is desirable as a choice to commit to specific cultural modes identified only as roots that one feels proud to identify with and live by as based on positive group values, moral derivations of a metaphysically defined identity communitarianism tends to place those identified as different in socially, morally, and politically disadvantaged relations with oneself. It often results in hierarchized social order that generates conflict such as we have seen across the globe over the past decadeand-a-half or two. To highlight these dangers, I have argued a stationless or hybridized idea of community, not just in post-colonial terms as Bhabha does, but as the driving dynamic in the experiences of real people defined by their multiple roles. Identity communitarianism is about having roots, which we keep and carry with us as we journey across other cultures, but which, nonetheless, are not immutable. Earlier, and in some more recent work, I have drawn attention to virtue communitarianism as well. Because of its recurrence in virtue theory as part of contemporary moral concerns, it is the best known and most widely discussed aspect of communitarianism whose emphasis is the communal rather than the purely individual character of virtue.
Finally, in regard to the third type of communitarianism, namely the social-political one, there could not be a better audience to remind about this than a conference in Dar Es
Salaam, Tanzania, albeit recent deviations and allures have tended to distract Tanzanians from it. This is the view that the primary end of a society or polity is to promote, encourage and embody the principle that certain goods ought to be shared equally across such polity, whether it is investment in infrastructural amenities, or the provision of jobs, or the establishment of educational facilities, and other means and modalities for improving the people's well-being, without fear or favour, as a fundamental obligation of the polity as a collective entity. My quest, then, is that our search for philosophical resources be focused on our own societies because we have enough evil to mull over, and enough examples of preceding good thinking to guide us in the direction of defining what
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is or are good for our societies. We cannot be the only place on earth where good is not considered to be sovereign.
